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The proliferation of international commercial courts aims to 
boost income from legal services and serve as a catalyst for newly 
found rules of law and thus attract investor confidence.  The lat-
ter is the underlying purpose for the creation of the Astana In-
ternational Financial Centre (AIFC) and its Court.  The Court’s 
legal framework is set out in the tradition of its competitors in 
the Gulf and similarly employs an impressive lineup of former 
senior judges from the United Kingdom.  It is a unique experi-
ment because it strives to create a balance between maintaining 
a judicial institution of the highest caliber while at the same 
time being subject to several limitations that jeopardize its in-
dependence.  As companies in the AIFC continue to grow in size 
and assets, the AIFC Court will inevitably become one of the key 
dispute resolution institutions in Asia over the next decade. 
 
* Professor of International Law, Hamad bin Khalifa University (Qatar 
Foundation), College of Law and Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown Uni-
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The provision of efficient legal services has emerged as an 
industry in and of itself throughout the last decade.1  Industri-
alized and newly-wealthy countries have realized that speedy 
and effective dispute resolution mechanisms anchored within 
national legal systems have the potential to attract interested 
fee-paying end-users while benefiting the local legal profession 
and peripheral services, such as translators, clerks, legal execu-
tives, administrators, and others.2  When a professional activity 
becomes an industry it also feeds into the local economy.3  Legal 
fees generate taxes4 and end-users must use hotels, restaurants, 
public and private transport, and airlines.  Additionally, if they 
have enjoyed their experience, end-users will most likely return 
as tourists.  The legal services sector in the UK is estimated to 
contribute three percent of the country’s GDP,5 and a large part 
of that is due to the London Commercial Courts,6 which largely 
attract international end-users.7  Therefore, it is no wonder that 
English courts have the most cost-effective court fees among all 
of their global competitors.8 
 
1 Everyone’s a Law Company, PRACTICE, July–Aug. 2019, https://theprac-
tice.law.harvard.edu/article/everyones-a-law-company/.    
2 See Suzanne Van Arsdale, User Protections in Online Dispute Resolu-
tion, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 107, 109, 125, 132–33 (2015).  
3 See Horst Eidenmuller, The Transnational Law Market, Regulatory 
Competition, and Transnational Corporations, 18 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 
707, 713 (2011). 
4 Robert W. Wood, IRS Form 1099 Rules for Settlements and Legal Fees, 
BUS. L. TODAY (Jan. 28, 2020), https://businesslawtoday.org/2020/01/irs-form-
1099-rules-settlements-legal-fees/. 
5 See THECITYUK, LEGAL EXCELLENCE, INTERNATIONALLY RENOWNED 
(2017), which demonstrates that the legal sector alone was found to generate 
311,000 jobs in the U.K. 
6 See Commercial Court, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/courts-tribu-
nals/commercial-court (last visited Sept. 23, 2020), for a discussion regarding 
the London Commercial Courts, which is a subdivision of the Queen’s Bench 
Division of the High Court of Justice and is comprised of several specialist 
chambers, including insurance, construction, contract and business, financial, 
commercial and others.  
7 In 2017–18, 70% of the Commercial Court’s work was intentional in na-
ture. See JUDICIARY OF ENG. & WALES, THE COMMERCIAL COURT REPORT 2017–
2018 7, 9 (2019). 
8 The courts of England and Wales do not charge a daily hearing fee and 
are thus the cheapest forum to settle disputes compared to both other courts, 
and in relation to arbitration. See Queen Mary Univ. of London Sch. of Int’l 




This “legal services tourism” (LST) is wholly different from 
the notion of forum shopping.  The latter assumes that a person, 
natural or legal, manipulates his or her personal circumstances, 
chief residence, incorporation, seat, or other, with the purpose of 
sustaining a civil suit in the courts of a country that would ordi-
narily deny jurisdiction.9  LST concerns a much broader and 
comprehensive commercial undertaking—the courts and legal 
services are just part of a larger undertaking whereby end-users 
move part or all of their business activities to a tailor-made fi-
nancial center or financial economic zone10 operating within a 
state.  These zones offer competitive corporate tax rates, hassle-
free administrative services—including the elimination of red 
tape and bureaucracy—as well as the promise of a global hub for 
business.11  One main attraction of such financial zones is an 
established court composed of largely international, highly ex-
perienced judges, with use of the English language,12 and oper-
ational transnational laws13 and principles that are no different 
from London and New York.14  Hence, these hybrid transna-
tional commercial courts operate as independent judicial entities 
wholly outside the procedural and substantive laws of the coun-
try hosting them and thus provide an additional layer of guar-
antees for investors that are otherwise suspicious of the 
 
Court Services: An overview of selected jurisdictions 3 (2013).  
9 See Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What’s Wrong with That?, 24 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 25, 25–26 (2005), who addresses why forum shopping 
should be considered wrong as a general rule. 
10 The impact of special economic zones on the rule of law in the target 
country has received little attention, but see MADELEINE MARTINEK, 
EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION IN CHINA BETWEEN EFFICIENCY AND LEGALITY: THE 
DELEGATED LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE 
321–22 (2018), for a discussion of the improvement of the legal design of exper-
imental regulations in special economic zones which is done by striking a bal-
ance between the pursuit of rapid socioeconomic progress on the one hand, and 
the increasing need and will to govern by the rule of law on the other. 
11 Id. at 322. 
12 Christoph A. Kern, English as a Court Language in Continental Courts, 
5 ERASMUS L. REV. 187, 188–89, 193, 209 (2012). 
13 See Legal High Comm. for Fin. Mkts. of Paris, Recommendations for the 
Creation of Special Tribunals for International Business Disputes 4, 13 (2017), 
https://publications.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/rapport_07_a.pdf, for a 
study regarding whether there was a need for Paris to establish an English-
speaking chamber. 
14 Id. at 12–13. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/1
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independence of ordinary local courts and institutions.15  Such 
hybrid courts must also compete with the institution of arbitra-
tion, which the parties have recourse to, as well as the jurisdic-
tion of other courts, which investors in a financial zone may 
simply choose through choice of forum clauses in their con-
tracts.16  At the same time, it should not be forgotten that certain 
long-entrenched institutions attract end-users for particular dis-
putes, but not for others.17  For example, one of the perceived 
advantages of New York City arbitration is that even mistakes 
of fact and law do not warrant vacatur of an otherwise rational 
award.18  
 
In the last two decades, three broad types of hybrid trans-
national commercial courts (HTCC) have been established.19  
The first is grounded in and is an integral part of quasi-inde-
pendent financial centers, like the Qatar International Court 
and Dispute Resolution Centre (QICDRC), which is an entity of 
the Qatar Financial Center (QFC), formerly known as the Com-
mercial and Civil Court of the Qatar Financial Center.20  The 
QICDRC’s jurisdiction is grounded in the governing law of the 
QFC.21  The same is true of the Dubai International Financial 
 
15 Eidenmuller, supra note 3, at 715. 
16 Id. at 722–23. 
17 See id., for an explanation that end users may choose to resolve disputes 
at these institutions for reasons such as “the quality of the judges and courts,” 
a neutral venue, and the institutions’ levels of professionalism. 
18 See Hackett v. Milbank, 86 N.Y.2d 146, 155 (1995), which demonstrates 
that few, if any, stay claims will ever be successful in this jurisdiction.  
19 Stephan Wilske, International Commercial Courts and Arbitration—
Alternatives, Substitutes or Trojan Horse?, 11 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 153, 156 
(2018). 
20 History–Origins of the Court, QATAR INT’L CT. & DISP. RESOL. CTR., 
https://www.qicdrc.gov.qa/history-origins-court (last visited Sept. 25, 2020). 
21 “The QFC was established by Law No. 7/2005 (the ‘QFC law’).” Zain Al 
Abdin Sharar & Michael Earley, The Qatar International Court: Judicial Up-
date, MENA BUS. L. REV. 46, 47 (2018). “The QFC consists of the QFC Author-
ity, the QFC Regulatory Authority, the Regulatory Tribunal, and the Civil and 
Commercial Court.” Id. Article 34 of the Court’s Regulations and Procedural 
Rules grants the court wide enforcement powers. Id. More specifically, Article 
34(3)(2) authorizes the Court to make “any order that it considers necessary in 
the interests of justice.” Id. “In addition, Schedule 6(16) of the QFC Law allows 
the QIC to use the provisions of the [Qatari] Civil and Commercial Procedures 
Law (Qatar Law No. 13/1990) where the QFC Law and Regulations are silent 
on a concerned matter.” Id. 
5
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Center (DIFC) Courts, whose jurisdiction emanates from DIFC-
related disputes.22  In fact, the DIFC has generated so much case 
law that it has succeeded to establish itself as a distinct and 
highly original legal system far beyond the otherwise forward-
looking legal system of Dubai and the Emirates.23 The subject 
matter of this article, the Court of the Astana Financial Services 
Centre, is part of this paradigm, as this Court’s creators aimed 
to emulate the DIFC court model.24  An additional element that 
renders these courts attractive is the autonomy of parties to 
choose the governing law of their choice.25  For example, the 
QICDRC is meant to apply QFC law and regulations as well as 
the law set out by the parties in their contractual relationships,26 
albeit in practice the Court relies predominantly on common law 
principles and case law.  This is not only because these principles 
and cases are more familiar to the majority of the judges, but 
also because English law is the predominant law in a majority 
of transnational commercial agreements.27  By way of illustra-
tion, in Leonardo S.p.A v. Doha Bank Assurance Company, the 
Court was faced with demand guarantees under the Uniform 
Rules for Demand Guarantees, which were adopted by the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce in 1991.28  Even so, the Court 
 
22 See Jayanth K. Krishnan & Priya Purohit, A Common Law Court in an 
Uncommon Environment: The DIFC Judiciary and Global Commercial Dispute 
Resolution, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 497, 497–98 (2014). 
23 Jayanth K. Krishnan, The Story of the Dubai International Financial 
Center Courts: A Retrospective 5 (Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. of Law, Research Pa-
per No. 404, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=3280883.  
24 Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar, The Court of the Astana International Finan-
cial Center in the Wake of Its Predecessors, 12 ERASMUS L. REV. 121, 122 (2019). 
25 Id. at 128. 
26 See QATAR FIN. CTR. LAW NO. 7 OF 2005 [QFC LAW NO. 7] (including 
amendments made by Law No. 14 of 2009), https://qfcra-en.thomsonreu-
ters.com/sites/default/files/net_file_store/QFC_Law-V3-Oct09.doc.pdf. This is 
also spelled out in Article 11 of the Court’s Regulations and Procedural Rules, 
whereas Article 4 enunciates the principle of the “overriding objective” of the 
Court, which is to “deal with all cases justly.” THE QATAR FIN. CTR. CIV. AND 
COM. CT. REGULS. AND PROCEDURAL RULES arts. 4, 11, 
https://www.qicdrc.gov.qa/sites/default/files/s3/wysiwyg/qfc_civil_and_com-
mercial_court_regulations_date_of_issuance_15_december_2010_0.pdf.   
27 See generally Why English Law Governs Most International Commer-
cial Contracts, QLTSCHOOL (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.qlts.com/blog/why-
english-law-governs-most-international-commercial-contracts (discussing why 
English law is preferred). 
28 Leonardo S.p.A v. Doha Bank Assurance Co., Case No. 12 of 2019, 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/1
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went on to examine the nature of such guarantees by reference 
to English case law.29 
 
The second type of HTCC is composed of expert judicial 
chambers, in addition to the existing judicial architecture of the 
states in which they are situated.30  The jurisdiction of these 
chambers is triggered by a choice of forum clause in the parties’ 
agreement.31  The primary consideration of such courts is to offer 
English-language dispute resolution in relation to complex 
transnational commercial disputes through speedy procedures 
and unlimited party autonomy, while still grounded in a stable, 
respectable, and well-performing legal system.32  This is the case 
with the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC), 
whose rationale is, no doubt, rather different from the HTCC en-
countered in the previous paragraph.33  The SICC is part of the 
Singapore Supreme Court and constitutes a division of the High 
Court.34  In accordance with section 18(d) of the Supreme Court 
of Judicature Act, the SICC has conferred jurisdiction over dis-
putes of an international and commercial nature submitted to it 
expressly by the parties and it may also hear cases transferred 
to it by the High Court.35  Hence, the SICC seeks to emulate the 
success of the London Commercial Court,36 and to a great degree, 
 
Judgment, Civ. and Com. Ct. of the Qatar Fin. Ctr. App. Div., ¶ 44 (2020), 
https://www.qicdrc.gov.qa/sites/default/files/s3/judgments/eng-
lish/case_no_12_of_2019_judgment_16_march_2020.pdf. 
29 Id. ¶ 42. 
30 See Wilske, supra note 19, at 157–59. 
31 See Man Yip, The Singapore International Commercial Court: The Fu-
ture of Litigation?, 12 ERASMUS L. REV. 81, 85 (2019); Hague Convention on 
Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art. 3, 
June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294; see also Vinmar Overseas (Sing.) Pte Ltd. v. 
PTT Int’l Trading Pte Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 159 of 2017, Judgment, Sing. Ct. 
App. (SGCA) ¶ 122 (2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/docs/default-
source/module-document/judgement/final-version-for-release-(v1)-pdf-1.pdf, 
for an example of how the Singapore Court of Appeals ruled on choice of court 
agreements and the element of party autonomy.  
32 Yeshnah D. Rampall & Ronan Feehily, The Sanctity of Party Autonomy 
and the Powers of Arbitrators to Determine the Applicable Law: The Quest for 
an Arbitral Equilibrium, 23 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 345, 348 (2018). 
33 Yip, supra note 31, at 86. 
34 Id. at 84. 
35 Supreme Ct. of Judicature Act, 2007, ch. 322, § 18(d) (Sing.). 
36 See Man Yip, The Resolution of Disputes before the Singapore Interna-
tional Commercial Court, 65 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 439, 445 (2016). 
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it has succeeded.37  The Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC) 
and The Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal  (NCCA),38 
which falls within this type of HTCC, is a specialist chamber of 
the Amsterdam District Court and the Amsterdam Court of Ap-
peal.39  Equally, the China International Commercial Court 
(CICC), which was set up by the Chinese Supreme Court, has a 
similar remit.40  In fact, the CICC’s jurisdiction is the result of 
an interpretation issued by the Supreme Court and, as a result, 
it is subject to the Chinese Civil Procedure Law.41  Such special-
ist chambers have not necessarily been welcomed by national 
parliaments, as the political tensions underlying the proposed 
Brussels International Business Court (BIBC)42 and a similar 
 
37 See SING. INT’L COM. CT., REPORT OF THE SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL COURT COMMITTEE ¶ 6 (2013) (“The SIAC is the fourth most pre-
ferred arbitral institution (after the International Chamber of Commerce 
(‘ICC’), the London Court of International Arbitration (‘LCIA’) and the Inter-
national Centre for Dispute Resolution (‘ICDR’)) . . . .”).  
38 NETH. COM. CT., https://netherlands-commercial-court.com/# (last vis-
ited Nov. 5, 2020). 
39 Neth. Com. Ct., Rules of Proc. for the Int’l Com. Chambers of the Am-
sterdam District Court (NCC District Court) and the Amsterdam Court of Ap-
peal (NCC Court of Appeal), DE RECHTSPRAAK, art. 1.1, § 1.1.1 (2018), 
https://www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/ncc-procesreglement-
en.pdf; Jurisdiction of the Netherlands Commercial Court, NETH. COM. CT., 
https://netherlands-commercial-court.com/jurisdiction-netherlands.html  (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2020); see also Georgia Antonopoulou & Xandra Kramer, The 
Netherlands Commercial Court holds its first hearing!, CONFLICT LAWS.NET 
(Feb. 18, 2019), https://conflictoflaws.net/2019/the-netherlands-commercial-
court-holds-its-first-hearing/ (delivering the court’s first judgment concerning 
an application for court permission to privately sell pledged shares). 
40 See A Brief Introduction of China International Commercial Court, 
CHINA INT’L COM. CT., http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/193/195/index.html 
(last updated June 28, 2018). 
41 Lance Ang, International Commercial Courts and the Interplay Between 
Realism and Institutionalism: A Look at China and Singapore, HARV. INT’L L. 
J.: ESSAYS, ONLINE SCHOLARSHIP (Mar. 2020), https://harvardilj.org/2020/03/in-
ternational-commercial-courts-and-the-interplay-between-realism-and-insti-
tutionalism-a-look-at-china-and-singapore/; see also China Guiding Cases Pro-
ject, Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the 
Establishment of the International Commercial Courts, STAN. L. SCH. (July 1, 
2018), https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/belt-and-road/b-and-r-texts/20180701-pro-
visions-re-intl-commercial-courts/, for a list of five types of cases the CICC has 
jurisdiction over per Article 2 of the CICC Provisions.  
42 See Erik Peetermans & Philippe Lambrecht, The Brussels International 
Business Court: Initial Overview and Analysis, 12 ERASMUS L. REV. 42, 43–44, 
44 n.21, 48 & n.81 (2019), for a discussion of the bills establishing the Brussels 
International Business Court including, Parl. St./Doc. parl. (Parliamentary 
Documents): Kamer/Chambre (Belgian House of Representatives) 54, 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/1
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English-speaking chamber in Germany exemplify.43 
 
The third type, which is not a distinct mechanism, but ra-
ther merges elements of all the aforementioned structures, con-
cerns the function of several HTCC to assist arbitral proceed-
ings.44  In this sense, chambers serve as flexible and highly 
expert ‘competent courts’ in the sense of article 6 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion.45  Examples of these types of HTCC include the Amsterdam 
International Commercial Court,46 the QICDRC,47 and the AIFC 
Court,48 among others. 
 
It is within this context that the Astana International Fi-
nancial Centre (AIFC) and its Court are examined.49  The AIFC 
and the Court are the result of a troubled past during which the 
newly founded Republic of Kazakhstan tried to grapple with the 
 
3072/007, at 59, and Parl. St./Doc. parl. (Parliamentary Documents): Ka-
mer/Chambre (Belgian House of Representatives) 54, 3072/010, at 4, which in-
dicate that the absence of an English-speaking chamber in any existing Bel-
gian court is due to the Belgian legislature’s reluctance in that creating one 
will only increase the number of disputes and how the Court outsources for 
“specialist” judges who must speak English and have expertise in international 
trade law. See also 2020 CONST. art. 151 (Belg.) (indicating that the High Coun-
cil of Justice for all of Belgium is composed of a Dutch-speaking college and a 
French-speaking college).  
43 Jenny Gesley, Germany: Regional Court of Frankfurt Establishes Eng-
lish-Speaking Chamber for Commercial Matters, LIBR. CONG. (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/germany-regional-court-of-frank-
furt-establishes-english-speaking-chamber-for-commercial-matters/; see also 
Gesetzentwurf [Cabinet draft], Deutscher Bundersrat: Drucksachen [BR] 
53/18 (Ger.) (establishing an English-speaking chamber for international com-
mercial matters in Germany). 
44 See History–Origins of the Court, supra note 20 (listing the variety of 
disputes heard in the QICDRC).  
45 See ILIAS BANTEKAS ET AL., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A COMMENTARY 96–103 (2020). 
46 See, e.g., Art. 4:1020–73 RV (Neth.). 
47 See Qatar Int’l Ct. and Disp. Resol. Ctr., Law No. 2 of 2017 Promulgat-
ing the Civ. and Com. Arbitration Law, art. 1 (Qatar), 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/107697/132714/F-
1501879919/law_no._02_2017_promulgating_the_civil_and_comm.pdf [herein-
after QFC Law No. 2]. 
48 See Astana Int’l Fin. Ctr., AIFC Arbitration Regulations ¶ 14 (2017) 
(Kaz.), https://aifc.kz/files/legals/73/file/aifc-arbitration-regulations-2017.pdf 




legal implications of its vast oil and gas deposits.50  Despite its 
wealth and its liberal attitude towards trade and investment, at 
least in contrast to most of its Central Asian neighbors, Kazakh-
stan’s laws have always been in a constant state of flux and 
rushed amendments.51  In addition, foreign investors have never 
really seen the country’s legal regime as stable or arbitration-
friendly.52  Kazakhstan’s court system is notoriously biased in 
favor of government entities, and its inward investment in fields 
other than energy have been weak.53  Because of this, it is not 
surprising that foreign investors and those engaging in trans-
border commerce have sought to make use of arbitration to re-
solve disputes, whether with government entities or other pri-
vate entities. 
 
The AIFC is a relative newcomer to the various hybrid com-
mercial courts mainly in the Gulf.54  The AIFC itself was not only 
set up to emulate those financial centers but also, and more im-
portantly, to alleviate Kazakhstan’s poor investment image 
abroad.55  It is not enough to set up one semi-autonomous finan-
cial center, even with a court comprising eminent international 
judges, in an attempt to fix Kazakhstan’s tarnished image.  The 
very fact that the Kazakhstani capital was moved from Almaty 
 
50 See ILIAS BANTEKAS ET AL., OIL AND GAS LAW IN KAZAKHSTAN: NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 229–31 (2004). 
51 See, e.g., POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT UNIT: 
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA REGION, REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN TAX STRATEGY 
PAPER REPORT NO. 36494-KZ VOLUME 1: A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR INCREASING THE 
NEUTRALITY OF THE TAX SYSTEM IN NON-EXTRACTIVE SECTORS 1, 39 (2008) (crit-
icizing “the arbitrary and unpredictable methods of raising revenues”). 
52 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 2018 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kazakhstan 8–10 (2018). 
53 See Paul Stronski, Kazakhstan at Twenty-Five: Stable but Tense, 
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT’L PEACE (Feb. 4, 2016), https://carnegieendow-
ment.org/2016/02/04/kazakhstan-at-twenty-five-stable-but-tense-pub-62642. 
54 See Barclay Ballard, Kazakhstan’s capital seeks new role amid shifting 
global markets, WORLD FIN. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.worldfinance.com/mar-
kets/kazakhstans-capital-seeks-new-role-amidst-shifting-global-markets.  
55 See The Strategy for development of the Republic of Kazakhstan, OFF. 
SITE PRESIDENT REPUBLIC KAZ., https://www.akorda.kz/en/official_docu-
ments/strategies_and_programs (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (noting that the 
Kazakhstan 2030 Vision considered economic development through a financial 
system as one of its seven priorities and the AIFC is a direct implementation 
of this vision); Ailuna R. Utegenova, Kazakhstan’s 2030 Development Strategy: 
Significance and Results, 2010 OSCE Y.B. 133, 136–37 (2011). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/1
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to the steppes of Astana, which then assumed the name of the 
Kazakhstani President (for life), Nursultan Nazarbayev, who 
hails from Astana,56 is evidence of authoritarianism of the high-
est caliber.  The Gulf states, on the other hand, already enjoyed 
high volumes of commerce, trade, and successful attempts at 
high technology before setting up financial centers to attract 
more financial service providers.57  The rule of law in the Gulf is 
strong despite the absence of democratic structures (at least in 
the Western sense).58  Additionally, public institutions and the 
standard of living in the Gulf far overshadow the standard of 
living in Kazakhstan, even though the latter is vastly oil-rich, 
has a relatively small population, and fertile land.59  It is, there-
fore, important to see the AIFC as part of a larger project, which 
includes several special economic zones and the creation of the 
Astana International Exchange (AIX).60  “The Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, the US Nasdaq, the Beijing-sponsored Silk Road 
Fund and Goldman Sachs all joined the AIFC Authority as 
shareholders and strategic partners in the exchange.”61  The Ka-
zakhstani government is committed to using the AIX to complete 
its ambitious privatization process by listing minority stakes in 
 
56 Ballard, supra note 54. 
57 See Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The Gulf States and the Rebalancing of 
Regional and Global Power, 3–5 (Jan. 8, 2014) (working paper) (on file with the 
Rice University James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy).  
58 See Mark Fathi Massoud, International Arbitration and Judicial Poli-
tics in Authoritarian States, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 11–12 (2014). 
59 See MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, KAZAKHSTAN: UNFULFILLED PROMISE? 3–10 
(2d ed. 2010); Nadim Kawach, High living standards in UAE, GULF NEWS 
(June 22, 2002), https://gulfnews.com/uae/high-living-standards-in-uae-
1.391517; Nazym Shedenova & Aigul Beimisheva, Social and Economic Status 
of Urban and Rural Households in Kazakhstan, 82 PROCEDIA SOC. & BEHAV. 
SCI. 585, 585–87 (2013).  
60 See Overview: Astana International Exchange (AIX), ASTANA INT’L 
EXCH., https://www.aix.kz/about-aix/overview/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2020). AIX 
is an entity situated with the AIFC and it is regulated by the Astana Financial 
Services Authority, which is an AIFC body. See id.; Rules and Regulations, 
ASTANA INT’L EXCH., https://www.aix.kz/rules-regulations-2/rules-regulations/ 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (“Pursuant to Part 3, Chapter 2 of the AIFC Frame-
work Regulations, AFSA has granted AIX a license to carry on one or more 
Market Activities as an Authorised Market Institution.”). 
61 Jacopo Dettoni, AIFC sets sights on central Asian financial hub status, 
FDI INTEL. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.fdiintelligence.com/article/75360. For 




some of the most prominent state enterprises.62 
 
The AIFC Court is a welcome contribution to Kazakhstan’s 
judiciary, but it must feed the latter with its exemplary work, 
practices, and development of the law—both substantive and 
procedural.  If the AIFC Court remains a stand-alone island in 
an ocean of ill-equipped, non-independent,63 largely biased na-
tional courts, and avoids externalizing its concern over the dete-
rioration of the rule of law, its status and legitimacy will be com-
promised.  Moreover, the AIFC Court will have to prove and 
justify why foreign investors should endow it with jurisdiction 
over and above arbitral tribunals64 seated outside Kazakhstan, 
even in respect of entities incorporated or listed in the AIFC.  At 
the time of writing this article, the AIFC Court had issued only 
a single order.65  At the same time, it has not attracted much 
analysis from dispute resolution scholars,66 but this may be at-
tributable to so-called “tribunal fatigue,” the proliferation of in-
ternational courts and tribunals, and perhaps the fact that few 
are optimistic that it will actually convince end-users of its 
value.67  This author is hopeful that the AIFC and the AIFC 
 
62 Dettoni, supra note 61. 
63 See Klaus Schwab & Xavier Sala-i-Martín, The Global Competitiveness 
Report, WORLD ECON. F. (2017–2018), http://www3.wefo-
rum.org/docs/GCR20172018/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2
017%E2%80%932018.pdf, for a survey on perceptions of judicial independence 
conducted in 2017, where Kazakhstan scored a 3.7 out of a possible 7, which 
shows some, but very few, signs of progress. See also Alexei Trochev, Between 
Convictions and Reconciliations: Processing Criminal Cases in Kazakhstani 
Courts, 50 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 107 (2017), for a more critical view of the per-
ceptions of judicial independence.  
64 See Queen Mary Univ. of London Sch. of Int’l Arb., Ctr. for Com. L. 
Stud. & White & Case, 2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution 
of International Arbitration 2 (2018) (finding in one of the largest surveys of 
corporate preferences that in respect to dispute resolutions, a staggering “97% 
of respondents indicate[d] international arbitration is their preferred method 
of dispute resolution . . . .”). 
65 See Aurora AG Ltd. v. Star Asian Mining Co., Case No. AIFC-
C/SCC/2019/0001, Judgment, Small Claims Ct. of the AIFC, 2 (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://court.aifc.kz/uploads/Case%20No.%201%20of%202019%20-%20Au-
rora%20AG%20Limited%20v%20Star%20Asian%20Mining%20Company%20
LLP_eng.pdf, for an exemplification of a decision under the small claims’ pro-
cedures.  
66 See Zambrana-Tévar, supra note 24, at 134. 
67 See Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and Tri-
bunals: International Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
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Court will realize the importance of this project for Kazakhstan 
and will zealously guard its independence and legitimacy and 
will contribute to the overall rule of law in Kazakhstan. 
II. THE PLACE OF THE AIFC COURT IN THE AIFC 
ARCHITECTURE 
The AIFC Court is an entity—specifically a ‘body’—within 
the general structure of AIFC.68  It is the existence of the AIFC 
and its designated goals and activities that necessitate the crea-
tion of the Court.69  In the mold of the DIFC and the QFC, the 
AIFC was conceived as a special economic zone70 meant to serve 
as a conduit for the investment in Kazakhstan of financial, eco-
nomic, and insurance service providers.71  “At the end of 2019, 
the gross inflow of FDI to Kazakhstan amounted to $ 24.1 bil-
lion[,]”72 which is significant in its attempt to diversify the econ-
omy.  The AIFC Constitutional Statute and succeeding acts and 
regulations provide significant benefits to foreign financial in-
vestors.73  However, similar to the Gulf special economic zone 
courts, it was recognized that, in the absence of a highly re-
garded court with special jurisdiction, the AIFC did not offer 
substantial guarantees to investors.74  The creation of the AIFC 
through constitutional law underpins its importance and distin-
guishes it from the other special economic zones operating in the 
 
160, 160 (2000). 
68 CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE NO. 438-V ZRK OF 7 [AIFC CONST. STATUTE] 
art. 9(1), at 8 (Kaz.), https://aifc.kz/files/legals/7/file/constitutional-statute-
with-amendments-as-of-30-december-2019.pdf. 
69 Id. art. 2, at 3. 
70 By 2020 there were thirteen special economic zones in Kazakhstan. See 
Special Economic Zone, KAZAKH INV. NAT’L CO. (2020), https://invest.gov.kz/do-
ing-business-here/fez-and/. These are regulated by the Law of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan No. 242-V art. 1 (Kaz.). See Ministry of Justice of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, On Judicial System and Status of Judges in the Republic of Ka-
zakhstan, art. 38–1 (Apr. 3, 2019), http://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z1900000242.  
71 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 2, at 3. 
72 Alzhanova Raushan, Volume of foreign investment gross inflow in Ka-
zakhstan reached $ 350 bln, KAZINFORM INT’L NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 8, 2020, 
10:20 AM), https://www.inform.kz/en/volume-of-foreign-investment-gross-in-
flow-in-kazakhstan-reached-350-bln_a3635217. 
73 Towards Best Practice Guidelines for the Development of Economic 
Zones, MENA-OCED INV. PROGRAMME 1, 8 (Nov. 23, 2009), 
https://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/44866585.pdf.  
74 Id. at 8–9. 
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country.  It is also part of the constitutional reforms which have 
taken place with a view to better separation of powers in accord-
ance with the requirements of the Council of Europe and the 
Venice Commission.75 
 
The AIFC Constitutional Statute distinguishes between 
AIFC bodies and AIFC participants.76  The former consists of the 
public entities that comprise the AIFC itself, each of which pos-
sesses a distinct legal personality and powers.77  The AIFC bod-
ies are the Management Council, the AIFC Governor, the AIFC 
Authority, the Astana Financial Services Authority, the AIFC 
Court, and the International Arbitration Centre.78  AIFC partic-
ipants comprise legal entities registered under the AIFC Acting 
Law, as well as legal entities recognized by AIFC.79 
III. JURISDICTION OF THE AIFC COURT 
Article 13(4) of the AIFC Constitutional Statute sets out the 
jurisdiction of the AIFC Court.80  While excluding authority over 
criminal and administrative proceedings, its jurisdiction encom-
passes: “(1) disputes between AIFC Participants [inter se], AIFC 
Participants and AIFC Bodies and an AIFC Participant or AIFC 
Body and its expatriate Employees; (2) disputes relating to ac-
tivities conducted in the AIFC and governed by the Acting Law 
of the AIFC; [and] (3) disputes transferred to the AIFC Court by 
agreement of the parties.”81  Section 26(1) of the 2017 AIFC 
 
75 See Eur. Consult. Ass., Kazakhstan Opinion on the Amendments to the 
Constitution, 110th Plen. Sess., Doc. No. 882 (2017), where the Venice Com-
mission remarked the progress that had been made; particularly, in regard to 
the devolution of power from the President, adding in paragraph 19 that, “[t]he 
draft propose[d] to abolish the right of the President to issue decrees having 
the force a law, which will certainly strengthen the legislative power.” “How-
ever, the possibility to establish priorities in the adoption of different pieces of 
legislation might somewhat reduce the positive impact of this important 
change.” Id. 
76 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 1(5), (9), at 3, 8. 
77 Id. art. 9, at 8. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. art. 1(5), at 3. 
80 Id. art. 13(4), at 10.  
81 Id. art. 13(4)(1)–(3), at 10. Curiously, this wording was slightly altered 
in Art 26(1)(b) of the AIFC Court Regulations. See Astana Int’l Fin. Ctr., AIFC 
Court Regulations: Resolution of the AIFC Management Council, pt. 5, § 26(1), 
at 16 (2017) (Kaz.), https://aifc.kz/files/legals/68/file/3.-legislation-aifc-court-
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Court Regulations includes an additional strand of jurisdiction 
in subsection (d), namely, “the interpretation of AIFC Acts.”82 
 
Unlike the QFC Court, which has authority over regulatory 
issues, which, in turn, may be viewed as administrative matters, 
the AIFC Court does not have such jurisdiction.83  Even so, in a 
dispute between an AIFC participant and an AIFC body, it is 
more than likely that the Court will have to pass judgment on 
regulatory or administrative issues, particularly where a partic-
ipant claims that a body has acted ultra vires or in violation of 
the AIFC Acts.  If such claims were to be viewed by the Court or 
the AIFC Bodies as “administrative” matters or proceedings 
and, hence, beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, it is unlikely 
that foreign investors would make much use of the Court.84  Sec-
tion 26(2) of the AIFC Court Regulations emphasizes that the 
term “disputes” “applies to civil or commercial disputes arising 
from transactions, contracts, arrangements or incidences.”85  
This, no doubt, excludes the range of administrative contracts 
and transactions entered into between private investors (AIFC 
participants) and AIFC bodies.86  As a result, it is wholly un-
likely that AIFC participants will not subject such matters to 
commercial or investment arbitration.  One must look to the 
 
regulations-2017.pdf [hereinafter AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017]. In particular, “activ-
ities” is replaced by “operations,” whereas “governed” is replaced by “regu-
lated.” Id. pt. 5, § 26(1), at 16. Moreover, “Acting Law of the AIFC” is replaced 
by “the law of the AIFC.” Id.  It is not clear if this is merely a drafting oversight 
or a conscious choice with clear implications. 
82 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(1)(d), at 16. 
83 Qatar Fin. Ctr. Regul. Auth., Introducing the Qatar Financial Centre 
Regulatory Authority 2–3 (2020). 
84 At the time of writing, Kazakhstan was in the process of finalizing an 
administrative code, replacing all other discrete acts. See Eur. Consult. Ass., 
Kazakhstan Opinion on the Amendments to the Constitution, 116th Plen. Sess., 
Doc. No. 931 (2018) [hereinafter Kaz. Op. on Amend. to Const.]. Article 30 of 
this code defines an administrative body as “a public body, a local authority, as 
well as other organisations which are authorised under the laws of the Repub-
lic of Kazakhstan to perform activities in the sphere of state governance of 
aimed at ensuring the interests of state and public (public functions).” Id. pt. 
IV, § f, ¶ 35, at 9. 
85 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(2), at 16. 
86 See Kaz. Op. on Amend. to Const., supra note 84, pt. V, ¶¶ 51–52, at 11 
(emphasizing that the draft administrative code was unclear about the juris-
diction of administrative courts, which might limit the discretion of the AIFC 
Court and certainly renders its authority in these matters unclear). 
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various entities established by AIFC bodies to ascertain whether 
disputes arising from those bodies fall within the jurisdiction of 
the AIFC Court.  The AIX Business Rules, for example, specify 
that the “[r]ules shall be governed by and construed in accord-
ance with the laws, acts and regulations of the AIFC and each 
Member irrevocably submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
AIFC Court and its legal jurisdiction.”87  Subsequently, all mem-
bers waive the right to challenge the jurisdiction of the AIFC 
Court.88 
 
Paragraph five of Section 26 of the AIFC Court Regulations 
make a slight exception to the “administrative process” excep-
tion.89  It stipulates that: 
 
The [AIFC] Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to hear and 
determine an appeal from the decision of an AIFC Body, Organi-
sation, or Participant, as provided for in the AIFC Constitutional 
Statute, AIFC Regulations, AIFC Court Rules, or other AIFC 
Rules where the appeal relates to: (a) a question of law; (b) an al-
legation of a miscarriage of justice; (c) an issue of procedural fair-
ness; or (d) a matter provided for in or under AIFC law.90 
 
Section 26(1) makes it clear that, with respect to the first two 
categories of disputes (a and b), the AIFC Court possesses exclu-
sive jurisdiction.91  Although the chapeau (i.e. paragraph 1) im-
plies that exclusive jurisdiction applies also with respect to dis-
putes transferred to the Court by agreement of the parties and 
the interpretation of AIFC Acts, it goes on to state in paragraph 
three of Section 26 that, “[t]he reference to ‘transferred to the 
Court by agreement of the parties’ in this Article applies to all 
parties, including parties not registered in the AIFC, such that 
all parties may ‘opt in’ to the jurisdiction of the Court by agree-
ing to give the Court jurisdiction pre or post-dispute.”92 
 
87 Astana Int’l Exch. [AIX], AIX Business Rules art 1.19.1 (emphasis omit-
ted). 
88 Id. art. 1.19.2. 
89 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(5), at 16. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. pt. 5, § 26(1), at 16. 
92 Id. pt. 5, § 26(3), at 16. 
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The jurisdiction contemplated in paragraph three is of some 
significance because assuming the AIFC bodies do not exercise 
authoritarian rule against the interests of investors, the bulk of 
disputes should be of a private nature between investors, their 
contractors, and sub-contractors.93  If the AIFC and its Court 
want to imitate the work and attractiveness of entities such as 
the London Commercial Court or the DIFC, it must first attract 
a critical mass of investors to the AIFC,94 which, in turn, will 
generate a healthy string of cases not only between registered 
participants but also non-registered parties.  This, of course, im-
plies that registered and non-registered parties will perceive the 
AIFC Court as a better alternative to international commercial 
arbitration, which is unlikely at this point. 
 
Paragraph eight of Section 26 of the AIFC Court Regula-
tions provides an additional dimension to the Court’s jurisdic-
tion.95  It states that “[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction in rela-
tion to any matter in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred 
on it by the AIFC Constitutional Statute or AIFC Regulations, 
including with regards to the Court’s authority to perform func-
tions to facilitate effective arbitration.”96 
 
The only possible meaning underlying this provision must 
be its reference to future forms of jurisdiction as and when the 
AIFC Constitutional Statute or Regulations are amended.  As to 
the last part of Section 26(8), the Court is clearly referenced as 
the “competent court” of AIFC arbitrations in the sense of Article 
6 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration.97  This eventuality is analyzed in more detail in a 
 
93 See AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(3), at 16. 
94 By July 2019, there were 200 investors registered in the AIFC, includ-
ing the China Construction Bank, which is the second largest asset globally. 
See 200 companies registered in AIFC jurisdiction, ASTANA INT’L FIN. CTR. (July 
2, 2019), https://aifc.kz/press-relizy/200-companies-registered-in-aifc-jurisdic-
tion/. 
95 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(8), at 17. 
96 Id.   
97 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985: with amendments 
as adopted in 2006, ch. 1, art. 6, at 4 (Vienna: United Nations, 2008), 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-





An issue that typically goes unnoticed in the statutes and 
operations of specialized courts, such as the AIFC Court, is their 
precise place within the complex web of private international 
law, particularly where choice of forum is concerned.98  This is-
sue is irrelevant in the sphere of arbitration because arbitration 
very much excludes the application of private international law 
unless the law of the seat deems otherwise.99  As a matter of 
international law, it is unclear whether specialized hybrid courts 
are part of the ordinary judicial machinery of the state in which 
they are situated.  If not, their status is similar to arbitral tribu-
nals, but their judgments will not be considered awards under 
the terms of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.100  Such a state of 
affairs would place specialized courts at a disadvantage, not only 
because it would disengage them from the global web of civil and 
commercial courts and their ability to communicate through the 
language of private international law, but it would also forbid 
the parties from recognizing and enforcing judgments through 
existing bilateral and multilateral channels because of a lack of 
reciprocity.  As a result, it is the position of this author that spe-
cialized courts—including the AIFC Court—are subject to the 
entire gamut of private international law similar to Kazakhstani 
courts. 
 
These considerations have unfortunately not been ad-
dressed except for a partial explanation in a subsequent section 
within the AIFC Court Regulations.  Paragraph ten of Section 
26 of the AIFC Court Regulations only refers to a jurisdictional 
delimitation between the AIFC Court and the ordinary courts of 
Kazakhstan, but again there is no clear rule as to how such 
 
98 See Gordon Blanke, Dubai courts v DIFC courts: just a jurisdictional 
stand-off or an outright declaration of war?, THOMSON REUTERS (June 12, 2017), 
http://arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com/dubai-courts-v-difc-courts-just-a-juris-
dictional-stand-off-or-an-outright-declaration-of-war/. 
99 See id. 
100 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 5, at 




delimitation is to be performed.101  It states that “[t]he Court 
shall consider the express accord of the parties to a case that the 
Court shall have jurisdiction and if the Court considers it desir-
able or appropriate, it may decline jurisdiction or may refer any 
proceedings to another Court within the Republic of Kazakh-
stan.”102 
 
This provision is confusing, to say the least, and contravenes 
the express authority of the Court to entertain disputes referred 
to it by registered and non-registered AIFC participants.103  How 
then should the Court consider it “desirable” or “appropriate” to 
decline jurisdiction and refer the parties to litigation before the 
Kazakhstani courts?  Several issues arise from this provision.  
First, there is no apparent rule justifying referrals to Kazakh-
stani courts in the event that the AIFC Court determines that it 
does not possess appropriate jurisdiction, especially if neither of 
the parties are Kazakh.104  Second, it suggests, or is otherwise 
not mindful, that the AIFC Court has no authority to apply the 
ordinary Kazakhstani private international law rules in order to 
determine the most appropriate jurisdiction for the dispute in 
question.105  Third, it undermines party autonomy, which, by the 
mutual choice of the AIFC Court, expressly and unequivocally 
rejected the jurisdiction of Kazakhstani courts in the first 
place.106  If foreign investors in the AIFC risk their disputes be-
ing referred to the Kazakhstani courts, which is the raison d’etre 
for the creation of the AIFC and its Court, then it will soon be-
come redundant. 
 
The Appeals Chamber of the AIFC Court possesses jurisdic-
tion, as already mentioned with respect to Section 26(1)(d) of the 
AIFC Court Regulations, to interpret AIFC Acts.107  Such refer-
rals effectively confer the status of “constitutional court” on the 
AIFC Court in the same manner as the referral process to the 
 
101 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(10), at 17. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. pt. 5, § 26(3), at 16. 
104 Id. pt. 5, § 26, at 16–17. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(1)(d), at 16. 
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Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).108  Referrals 
may only be made by: “(a) the Court of First Instance concerning 
any matter before it; (b) any of the AIFC Bodies; or (c) any of the 
AIFC Participants with leave of the Court of Appeal.”109 
 
This jurisdiction, which feels natural to the Court, provides 
an important function.110  This “constitutional” role is not unu-
sual in closed systems such as the EU, QFC, and AIFC, but the 
use of such authority across the various courts is hardly uni-
form.111  Some courts, such as the CJEU, are ambitious, far-
reaching, and not afraid to challenge their creators.112  In con-
trast, it is doubtful that specialized courts, such as the AIFC 
Court, are prepared to challenge the boundaries of their man-
date. 
 
Finally, the jurisdiction of the AIFC Court encompasses a 
small claims dimension.  Paragraph seven of Article 26 states 
that: 
 
The Small Claims Court shall have a special fast track procedure 
for claims below a specified value and Small Claims Court juris-
diction shall be defined in the AIFC Court Rules. Appeals of deci-
sions of the Small Claims Court may be brought to the Court of 
First Instance, subject to the permission of the Court as set out in 
the AIFC Court Rules. No appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from 
any judgment given of the Court of First Instance on an appeal 
from the Small Claims Court.113 
 
 
108 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union art. 267, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326); AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, 
supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(1), at 16. 
109 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(12)(a)–(c), at 17. 
110 See id. pt. 9, § 38, at 23; see also LORD WOOLF, A VISION OF THE AIFC 
COURT 28–29, 32–33 (Christopher Campbell-Holt ed., 2019) (providing infor-
mation related to the AIFC Court’s jurisdiction and stating that the “natural 
capacity of AIFC Court judges [is] to apply and interpret the AIFC law”). 
111 Gerald Lebovits & Delphine Miller, Litigating in the Qatar Interna-
tional Court, 28 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N INT’L L. PRACTICUM 54, 54–56 (2015); 
Gráinne de Búrca, Internalization of International Law by the CJEU and the 
US Supreme Court, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 987, 987–89 (2015).  
112 de Búrca, supra note 111, at 987–89. 
113 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(7), at 17. 
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A small claims jurisdiction exists in all specialized hybrid tribu-
nals, which is pretty consistent with the statutes of all of the 
AIFC Court’s competitors.114 
IV.  APPLICABLE LAW 
The authority of the AIFC and its Court should be derived 
from the Kazakhstani Constitution, whether directly or implic-
itly.  Article 75(4) thereof clarifies that the Constitution shall 
establish all courts and tribunals, and that “[t]he establishment 
of special and emergency courts under any name is not al-
lowed.”115  A 2017 amendment to the Constitution did in fact al-
low the legal regime of the AIFC to exist but did not specifically 
refer to the AIFC Court.116  As a result, several experts have ex-
pressed concern as to whether the AIFC Court conforms with the 
Kazakhstani Constitution.117  Article 13(2) of the AIFC Consti-
tutional Statute exacerbates this state of affairs by declaring 
that “[t]he AIFC Court is independent in its activities and is not 
a part of the judicial system of the Republic of Kazakhstan.”118  
Apart from the issue of constitutionality, which seems to have 
been brushed under the carpet, it is not at all clear that the AIFC 
Constitutional Statute is competent to make this sharp distinc-
tion between ordinary Kazakhstani courts and the AIFC Court.  
This is so on account of several inter-connected considerations.  
First, it may conflict with bilateral and multilateral treaties to 
which Kazakhstan is a party, relating to the status and powers 
of national courts.119  There would be nothing in those treaties 
 
114 In fact, small claims judgments have seen a boost in DIFC and are 
considered by many as the cornerstone of access to justice. See Press Release: 
Commercial claims on the rise at DIFC Courts, DUBAI INT’L FIN. CTR., (Feb. 19, 
2018, 4:49 AM), https://www.difc.ae/newsroom/news/commercial-claims-rise-
difc-courts/. 
115 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN, Aug. 30, 1995, 
art. 75(4).  
116 Id. art. 2(3-1).  
117 Zambrana-Tévar, supra note 24, at 123 & n.33. 
118 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(2), at 10. 
119 See Maulenov K. Syrbaevich, Bilateral Investment Treaties of the Re-
public of Kazakhstan with Foreign States, 39 INST. LEGIS. REPUBLIC KAZ. 81, 
81–87 (2015); see also International Investment Agreements Navigator: Ka-
zakhstan, U.N. INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/interna-
tional-investment-agreements/countries/107/kazakhstan (last visited Oct. 20, 
2020), for a list of BITs to which Kazakhstan is a party. 
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that allows member states to exclude application to one or more 
judicial institutions, or conversely to unilaterally include an ex-
traordinary judicial body outside of the ordinary justice sys-
tem.120  Second, the AIFC Court would possess the authority to 
make judgments and decisions only within the confines of the 
AIFC, but these would have no force in Kazakhstan.121  In addi-
tion, the AIFC Court would have no authority similar to ordi-
nary Kazakhstani courts in making domestic or worldwide in-
junctions and orders—including for reasons already stated.  
Third, all these considerations make it unclear whether the 
rules of private international law applicable to ordinary Kazakh-
stani courts also apply to the AIFC Court.  We have already 
stated that they do, but the AIFC Court, or other AIFC body, 
may rely on Article 13(2) of the AIFC Constitutional Statute and 
declare that it, in fact, does not. 
 
In practice, and given Kazakhstan’s political climate, it 
would be unrealistic for the Court or other AIFC Body to either 
declare the AIFC Court unconstitutional—or that there is some 
serious inconsistency between AIFC Acts and Kazakhstani 
law—in such a manner that excludes the AIFC Court from Ka-
zakhstan’s extensive treaty relations as they apply to its judicial 
system.  Claims of this nature that challenge the very legiti-
macy, lawfulness, and existence of an extraordinary court are 
not unusual, and the courts in question have no problem provid-
ing extensive—and convincing—arguments in their favor.122  In 
any event, the AIFC Court will take for granted that all AIFC 
Acts are consistent and in conformity with the Kazakhstani Con-
stitution. 
 
Surprisingly, one finds a hierarchy of sources for the AIFC, 
and implicitly for the Court, in Part 2, Section 8 of the AIFC 
Regulations on AIFC Acts of 2017.  This regulation states as fol-
lows: 
 
120 See Syrbaevich, supra note 119. 
121 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN NO. 377-V 
ZRK [KAZ. CODE OF CIV. PROC.] art. 7. 
122 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 21 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 




(1) Correlation of legal force of Acting Law of the AIFC is con-
strued in accordance with the following descending levels: 
(a) paragraph 3-1 of article 2 of the Constitution of the Re-
public of Kazakhstan; and 
(b) the Constitutional Statute; and 
(c) the Management Council Resolution on AIFC Bodies; and 
(d) Regulations; and 
(e) Rules; and 
(f) other Acts of relevant AIFC Bodies adopted to regulate 
specific issues.123 
 
This is a descending order, and the remainder of this provision 
sets out a methodology for resolving conflicts between higher 
and lower levels, as well as between equal levels.124  It should 
have been stated from the outset that the “Acting Law of the 
AIFC” encompasses the entire legal framework of the AIFC.  
 
Paragraph five of Article 13 of the AIFC Constitutional Stat-
ute makes a remarkable statement about the actual law or “legal 
system” that is meant to be applied as the default law—i.e. if the 
parties have not already chosen a “law” or “legal system” in their 
contract.125  This article states that “[t]he activities of the AIFC 
Court are governed by the resolution of the Council On the Court 
of Astana International Financial Centre, which is based on the 
principles and legislation of the law of England and Wales and 
the standards of leading global financial centres.”126  
 
Although some word selection is unfortunate,127 the mean-
ing is abundantly clear.  The entirety of this section (on applica-
ble law) is found, in principle, in this provision.128  Given that 
the AIFC and its Court aspire to emulate the Gulf financial 
 
123 AIFC, AIFC Reguls. on AIFC Acts No. 1 of 2017, pt. 2, ch. 1, § 8(1)(a)–
(f), at 5 (Kaz.), https://aifc.kz/files/legals/207/file/1.-aifc-regulations-on-aifc-
acts-2017_new-design.pdf [hereinafter AIFC Regul. on AIFC Acts].  
124 Id. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 8(2), at 5. 
125 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(5), at 10. 
126 Id.  
127 While “activities” refers to the external/outer workings of the Court, 
this confusingly encompasses administrative matters and its relation to the 
state, whereas a better formulation would be: “the (default) law applicable to 
legal proceedings before the Court . . . .” 
128 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(5), at 10. 
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centers,129 as well as the underlying notion that these are driven 
by the common law, as applied by a selection of top judges, such 
an applicable law makes eminent sense.  In the opinion of this 
author, the entire rationale for Article 13(5) of the AIFC Consti-
tutional Statute is, at worst, misconceived, and, at best, misun-
derstood or overplayed.  For one thing, the law of England and 
Wales is not synonymous with the broader notion of the (trans-
national) common law applied by institutions such as the Lon-
don Commercial Court, the DIFC, the QFC Court,130 and others.  
In fact, these courts will apply English law and transnational-
ized common law only where the parties’ choice of law so dic-
tates, or where it is appropriate.131  Neither Dubai nor Qatar has 
substituted the substantive law of their specialized financial 
centers with the law of another nation.132  The success of the Gulf 
specialized courts lies in the fact that, by allowing unlimited 
party autonomy over the choice of governing law, English law 
has become predominant in the majority of agreements.133  It is 
a natural extension for such courts to thereafter apply English 
law to the cases before them.  We have already referred to Leo-
nardo S.p.A., where the QFC Court, in dealing with demand 
guarantees under the Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees—
an ICC instrument—went on to examine the nature of such 
guarantees by reference to English case law.134 
 
A contentious issue here concerns the scope of Article 13(5).  
The law of England and Wales encompasses not only statutes 
and the common law, but also obligations incumbent on the 
United Kingdom by virtue of international treaties and 
 
129 Matthew S. Erie, The New Legal Hubs: The Emergent Landscape of 
International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 60 VA. J. INT'L L. 225, 276–77 
(2020). 
130 See QFC LAW NO. 7, supra note 26, art. 7–8.  
131 See Why English Law Governs Most International Commercial Con-
tracts, supra note 27. 
132 See Camille Paldi, Proposal for the Dubai World Islamic Finance Arbi-
tration Tribunal (DWIFAC) and Jurisprudence Office (DWIFACJO) as the Dis-
pute Resolution Mechanism and Center for the Islamic Finance Industry, 2 J. 
ISLAMIC BANKING & FIN. 15, 16–17 (2014). 
133 See Why English Law Governs Most International Commercial Con-
tracts, supra note 27. 
134 Leonardo S.p.A., Case No. 12 of 2019, Judgment ¶ 44. 
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customary international law.135  These international treaties 
cannot artificially be divorced from “English law” because con-
stitutional statutes such as the Human Rights Act permeate 
every aspect of English law.136  When the AIFC Court comes to 
apply English law it should do so in its entirety, as that is how 
it would have been applied by the courts of England and Wales.  
Any other result would be inconsistent with the parties’ legiti-
mate expectations.  Moreover, the wording of Article 13(5) sug-
gests wholesale “legal transplantation,” which has not only 
failed as a model of law reform but has universally been con-
demned by the scholarly community.137  No doubt, it would be 
disastrous for the reputation of AIFC if the parties or the Court 
were to identify gross inconsistencies between English law and 
AIFC Acts, or the Kazakhstani Constitution itself!  Article 13(6) 
of the AIFC Constitutional Statute makes much more sense.  It 
states that, “[i]n adjudicating disputes, the AIFC Court is bound 
by the Acting Law of the AIFC and may also take into account 
final judgments of the AIFC Court in related matters and final 
judgments of the courts of other common law jurisdictions.”138 
 
Another serious issue to consider is the extent to which the 
AIFC Court is bound by the customary law and international 
treaties to which Kazakhstan is a party.  Some treaties—such as 
those concerning human rights—are territorial, including effec-
tive control over foreign territory, and, hence, apply in respect of 
any action in the incumbent state’s territory, irrespective of the 
constitutional status of the person or entity in question.139  We 
have already stated that the separation of the AIFC Court from 
the ordinary Kazakhstani judiciary through the constitution has 
no retrospective effect on subsequent treaties but it may affect 
its rights and duties if Kazakhstan were to carve out a special 
 
135 See Tawhida Ahmed & Israel de Jesús Butler, The European Union 
and Human Rights: An International Law Perspective, 17 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 771, 
776 (2006). 
136 Human Rights Act, 1998 c. 42 (Eng.). 
137 Jaakko Husa, Developing Legal System, Legal Transplants, and Path 
Dependents: Reflections on the Rule of Law, 6 CHINESE J. COMPAR. L. 129, 137 
(2018); Toby S. Goldbach, Why Legal Transplants?, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
583, 584 (2019). 
138 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(6), at 10. 
139 See U.N. Hum. Rts. Off. of the High Comm’r, The United Nations Hu-
man Rights Treaty System, Fact Sheet No. 30/Rev. 17 (2012). 
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regime in those treaties (whether negative or positive) for the 
AIFC Court.  Although this matter is not made explicit in the 
AIFC Constitutional Statute, it is spelled out elsewhere.  For ex-
ample, Part 5, Section 45(1) of the AIFC Arbitration Regulations 
makes it clear that AIFC awards and judgments are tantamount 
to Kazakhstani awards and judgments for the purposes of en-
forcement in other jurisdictions.140  It should therefore be taken 
for granted that the AIFC Court is a Kazakhstani court for the 
purposes of Kazakhstan’s treaty, and customary, obligations.141 
A. Party Autonomy in the Choice of Governing Law 
The attractiveness of special regimes such as the AIFC lies 
not only in the business and financial benefits and incentives 
provided to foreign investors, but also on account of the at-
tendant legal certainty and the rule of law.  Given that arbitra-
tion is a readily available choice that is susceptible to global en-
forcement, a specialized court such as the AIFC Court and its 
Gulf competitors must be able to offer something more, or at 
least something of an equivalent value.  In the case at hand, this 
might be the possibility of enforcing AIFC judgments against en-
tities in Kazakhstan, which is otherwise difficult through any 
other foreign award because of the alleged obstinacy of Kazakh-
stani courts.142  Such an incentive should not be underestimated.  
No doubt, the processes, and procedures before the AIFC Court 
must be as flexible and party-oriented as in international com-
mercial arbitration.  
 
 
140 AIFC Regul. on AIFC Acts, supra note 123, pt. 5, ch. 2, § 45(1), at 17. 
141 Even so, it is unlikely that it will be allowed to enforce foreign judg-
ments or awards against the Kazakhstani state. See, for example, Republic of 
Kazakhstan v. Ascom Group, S.A., No. 133/19, Judgment, Luxembourg Supe-




thursday-19th-december-2019, where the court recognized and enforced an 
award in the hundreds of millions of dollars range, which the Kazakhstani gov-
ernment unsuccessfully tried to prove was awarded based on fraudulent 
grounds. 
142 See Dispute Resolution Around the World: Kazakhstan, BAKER 




In this respect, the ability of the parties to choose the law of 
their choice is of immense importance.  This right is aptly recog-
nized in Section 43 of the AIFC Regulations on AIFC Acts, which 
provides that “[a]n express choice of a governing law in a con-
tract is effective against all Persons affected by the choice.”143  In 
the absence of a choice of law clause, the contract is to be gov-
erned by the Acting Law of the AIFC,144 which is effectively the 
law of England and Wales, as this is supplemented by the vari-
ous other sources analyzed in previous sections.  This is a some-
what unsatisfactory situation.  While it provides a degree of le-
gal certainty to the parties, this situation is, nonetheless, rather 
antithetical to the general rule, whereby in the absence of a 
choice of governing law this is either selected by reference to pri-
vate international law rules (in litigation),145 or by reference to 
the law that is closest to the parties’ contract (arbitration).146  It 
may well be that the drafters of this provision desired to avoid 
complex conflicts of law determinations that protract and com-
plicate proceedings, in which case this is a welcome compromise.  
However, Article 43 is incomplete and poses a serious danger to 
the parties.  In particular, it is unclear if the notion of “govern-
ing” law follows the Rome Convention paradigm,147 or if, instead, 
it is predicated on the much broader party autonomy paradigm 
set out in international arbitration, whereby it is not restricted 
 
143 AIFC Regul. on AIFC Acts, supra note 123, pt. 5, ch. 2, § 43, at 20. 
144 Id. pt. 5, ch. 2, § 44, at 20. 
145 C.M.V. CLARKSON & JONATHAN HILL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 218–20 (4th 
ed. 2011). The 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations was consolidated several times. See generally 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 
[hereinafter Rome I], for the current version of the law applicable to contrac-
tual obligations. 
146 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 97, ch. VI, art. 28(2), at 17; see 
2017 Arbitration Rules, INT’L CHAMBER COM. (2017), https://iccwbo.org/dispute-
resolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration/#article_21 (providing in 
Article 21(1) that in the absence of an express choice of substantive law, “the 
arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be appro-
priate”); see also ILIAS BANTEKAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 38–40 (2015) (explaining that Article 4(1) of Rome 1 indicates 
that absent a choice of law clause, disputes are governed pursuant to the law 
of a party’s residence). 
147 H. Matthew Horlacher, The Rome Convention and the German Para-
digm: Forecasting the Demise of the European Convention on the Law Applica-
ble to Contractual Obligations, 27 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 178, 178–80 (1994). The 
conflict rules of the forum will set out particular criteria which link the con-
tract in question to a system of law – these criteria are known as “connecting 
factors.” See Rome I, supra note 145, art. 4(1). 
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to the “legal system” of a country. 
 
Unlike the Rome I Article 1(1) restrictions on the conflict of 
laws rules—i.e., the meaning of “law” as it concerns governing 
law over a dispute—which limit the governing law of a particu-
lar legal system, “such as that of France, the situation is differ-
ent in respect of arbitral proceedings.”148  Under Rome I: 
 
‘African customary law,’ the UNIDROIT Principles of Interna-
tional Commercial Contracts or ‘Islamic law’ are not considered 
national legal systems as such, the justification being that they are 
indeterminate and vague and hence give rise to uncertainty.149  It 
is thought that trying to determine what Islamic law is in a par-
ticular case, as opposed to Saudi law which despite its sharia foun-
dation is considered predictable, would give rise to several confus-
ing and conflicting versions and interpretations.150 
 
These perceptions on the meaning of ‘law’ and ‘legal systems’ 
may be problematic in litigation,151 but not for arbitration be-
cause it is not only assumed that the parties are well aware of 
the implications of their choice of law (and their ability to choose 
the law of their choice) but also because the appointment of ar-
bitrators is based on their expertise of the parties’ chosen law.  
Unlike litigation, in international arbitration the parties are 
free to designate any ‘law’ as their governing law, irrespective if 
 
148 BANTEKAS, supra note 146, at 44; see Emmanuel Gaillard, The Role of 
the Arbitrator in Determining the Applicable Law, in THE LEADING 
ARBITRATORS’ GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 185, 197–98 (Lawrence W. 
Newman & Richard D. Hill eds., 2014). 
149 BANTEKAS, supra note 146, at 44; Beximco Pharm. Ltd. v. Shamil Bank 
of Bahrain E.C., [2004] EWCA 19.  
150 BANTEKAS, supra note 146, at 44. “This is because in strict legal terms 
there is no single or unified Islamic law.” Id. at 44 n.18. “The four key sources 
of Sunni Islamic law on the basis of their hierarchy are as follows: 1) Qur’an; 
2) the sunnah (representing the sayings and actions of the Prophet); 3) qiyas 
(human reasoning by analogy, but only if adopted by a large enough majority 
of Muslim scholars); and 4) ijma, which represents the actual consensus of the 
Muslim scholarly community.” Id. “The four different schools of Sunni Islam, 
with the exception of the Qur’an, cannot always agree on the veracity of all the 
other sources and in any event ascribe varying interpretations to these and 
disputed sources.” Id. “All this justifies the argument as to the non-existence 
of a single, coherent, verifiable Islamic law.” Id. 




this is classified as a legal system or not under the Rome Con-
vention (or other conflict of law rules).  In fact, it is not uncom-
mon for parties to designate as their governing law the lex mer-
catoria, equitable principles (ex aequo et bono), Islamic law, 
public international law and others, such as EU law,152 that are 
not ordinarily considered legal systems.153 
 
In the particular context of the AIFC Court, I would like to 
think that in the pursuit of commercial justice, experienced for-
eign judges will conclude that party autonomy is not limited by 
the private international law paradigm.154  Rather, the parties 
may choose any law or principles, other than the law of a legal 
system, as long as it does not offend Kazakhstani public policy 
or the AIFC Acting Law.155  It is crucial that the Court clarifies 
this position in its first judgments so as to alleviate any concerns 
that prospective parties may have. 
V.  PARTY AUTONOMY IN RESPECT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
One of the key features of broad party autonomy is the abil-
ity of the parties to agree on the procedural rules applicable to 
the proceedings, subject, however, to the right to a fair trial.  
This principle is applicable regardless of the nature of the pro-
ceedings.156  Procedural party autonomy is the cornerstone of ar-
bitration.157  The voluntary character of arbitration would be 
 
152 For an example of a case where the parties designated European Union 
law as their governing law, see Gaillard, supra note 148, at 201 & n.33. 
153 BANTEKAS, supra note 146, at 44–45; see also In re Arb. between Raisler 
Corporation & N.Y.C. Housing Auth., 32 N.Y.2d 274, 283 (1973) (holding that 
“an arbitrator may decide the issues as equity and justice require, unbound by 
the rigors of law”). Given that the parties had not authorized the arbitrator to 
act as amiable compositeur or decide the case ex aequo et bono, this case may 
be a bit of a stretch.  
154 This conclusion is further enhanced by Section 29(1)(c) of the AIFC 
Court Regulations, which reads that the law to be applied by the Court shall 
be “such law as appears to the Court to be the most appropriate in the facts 
and circumstances of the dispute.” See AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 
8, § 29(1)(c), at 21. 
155 Id. pt. 8, § 29(1)(b), at 21. 
156 See Ilias Bantekas, Equal Treatment of Parties in International Com-
mercial Arbitration, 69 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q.  991, 991–93, 1001 (2020). 
157 Sunday A. Fagbemi, The Doctrine of Party Autonomy in International 
Commercial Arbitration: Myth or Reality?, 9 AFE BABALOLA UNIV. J. SUST. DEV. 
L. & POL’Y 222, 224 (2015). 
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seriously undermined if the parties were unable to dictate how 
arbitral proceedings are to be held and conducted.  Control over 
the process is hardly an end to itself.  Its purpose is to mitigate 
the adverse qualities of litigation or alternative dispute resolu-
tions and, hence, to ultimately satisfy the parties’ business de-
mands in a particular case.158  By way of illustration, if the dis-
pute concerns a sensitive or pressing issue, the parties may well 
urge the tribunal to resolve the dispute as timely as possible,159  
perhaps through fast-track proceedings.  Equally, if the parties 
feel that a hearing would spiral costs and provide little clarity to 
the dispute, they can decide to dispense with an oral hearing al-
together, agreeing solely to a documents-based process.160 
 
The prevalence of party autonomy in the conduct of arbitral 
proceedings is manifest in both the New York Convention and 
the Model Law, as well as customary international law; the lat-
ter as evidenced by the consistent laws and judicial practice of 
states, as well as the proliferation of institutional rules to this 
effect.161  Article 19(1) of the Model Law provides that “the par-
ties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbi-
tral tribunal in conducting the proceedings[,]”162 whereas Article 
V(1)(d) of the New York Convention stipulates that a foreign 
award may be refused enforcement and recognition if “the arbi-
tral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the 
parties . . . .”163  The parties are free to choose any model they 
desire or no model whatsoever, or, alternatively, leave this task 
to the tribunal.164 
 
The AIFC Court, as well as its other foreign counterparts, 
was meant to function as a conventional court, albeit with all the 
benefits and privileges typically associated with specialized 
 
158 See Fagbemi, supra note 157, at 223–24. 
159 Id. at 230. 
160 See id. 
161 Advocate Rajveer, Parties’ autonomy in international commercial arbi-
tration, 9 INT’L J. SCI. & ENG’G RSCH. 1204, 1204 (2018). 
162 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 97, ch. V, art. 19(1), at 14. 
163 The New York Convention, supra note 100, art. V(1)(d), at 10. 
164 See, e.g., THE LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, THE 




hybrid tribunals.165  Hence, there is nothing in the AIFC Laws, 
including the AIFC Court Rules, suggesting that party auton-
omy may, or can, supersede the prevailing rules of civil proce-
dure.  Even so, although this has not yet been tested, a minor 
window of opportunity does exist.  Section 29(1)(c) of the AIFC 
Court Regulations allows the Court to apply “such [procedural] 
law as appears to the Court to be most appropriate in the facts 
and circumstances of the dispute.”166  Although such a determi-
nation will ultimately be made by the Court, the parties may 
offer their views to which the Court can be receptive.167  In this 
manner, the AIFC Court may circumvent non-mandatory proce-
dural rules, seemingly on its own initiative and in the best in-
terest of proceedings, even if triggered by the parties.  This line 
of thinking is further enhanced by Sections 30(1) and (2) of the 
AIFC Court Regulations, which confer on the Chief Justice a 
wide margin of discretion, even above arbitrators—the latter be-
ing limited by the parties’ agreement.168  This reads: 
 
(1) AIFC Court Rules and Practice Directions may provide for the 
practice and procedure to be followed in the Court.  They may be 
made, amended, repealed, or revoked, by the Chief Justice of the 
Court only, except that he may nominate a Judge of the Court to 
exercise his functions under this Article.  
(2) AIFC Court Rules may provide for any matter of practice or 
procedure to be made and/or governed by Practice Directions.169 
 
The Court Rules and Practice Directions thus have the potential 
of conferring significant discretionary powers on judges in ap-
plying and shaping rules of procedure and evidence.  The range 
of experienced judges appointed to the AIFC Court essentially 
ensures that the judges will be prepared to work with the parties 
in shaping their rules in such a manner that promotes the par-
ties’ mutual interests and the interests of procedural justice.170  
 
165 Zambrana-Tévar, supra at note 24, at 123. 
166 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 8, § 29(1)(c), at 21. 
167 See AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(6), at 10. 
168 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 9, § 30(1)–(2), at 22. 
169 Id. 
170 See id. pt. 2, § 12, at 6–8.  
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This is very evident in the AIFC Court Rules.171  In theory, the 
entire process is subject to the so-called “overriding principles,” 
as these are set out in Article 1.7 of the AIFC Court Rules, which 
are based on the notions of justice, fairness, and proportionality, 
and which the Court is obliged to enforce in its administration 
of justice.172  Part 16 of the AIFC Court Rules sets out an exten-
sive outline for case progression conferences in which the parties 
are expected to take on an active role by agreeing on appropriate 
case management directions.173 
VI.  THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIFC COURT AND ITS POWERS 
The AIFC Court consists of only two instances, namely first 
and appellate levels.174  Decisions of the appellate chamber are 
binding and not subject to further judicial scrutiny175 and as a 
result, produce res judicata.  There is a further specialist divi-
sion in the form of a small claims court.176  The AIFC Court is 
headed by the Chief Justice and consists of other judges, all of 
which are “appointed and removed by the President of the Re-
public of Kazakhstan on the recommendation of the Governor of 
the AIFC.”177  Although Article 13(2) of the AIFC Constitutional 
Statute emphasizes that the Court is an independent body, the 
appointment and removal of its judges by the President seriously 
undermines claims of independence.178 
 
171 At the time of writing, the Chief Justice had already issued AIFC Court 
Rules, effective as of January 1, 2018. See Astana Int’l Fin. Ctr. Ct. Rules pt. 
1, §§ 1.6–1.8, at 1 (2018) (Kaz.), https://aifc.kz/files/legals/69/file/3.-legislation-
aifc-court-rules-2018.pdf [hereinafter AIFC Ct. Rules 2018]. In accordance 
with Art 1.5 of the AIFC Court Rules, Practice Directions “may modify or dis-
apply any provision of [the] Rules.” Id. pt. 1, § 1.5, at 1. 
172 Id. §§ 1.6–1.7, at 1. 
173 Id. § 16, at 45–47. 
174 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(3), at 10. 
175 Id. art. 13(7), at 10. 
176 See AIFC Ct. Rules 2018, supra note 171, pt. 1, § 1.3(1), at 1; AIFC Ct. 
Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 2, § 9, at 6. 
177 See AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(3-1), at 10. 
178 Id. art. 13(2), (3-1); see also G.A. Res. 40/32, Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary (Nov. 29, 1985) (“The independence of the judi-
ciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or 
law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to 
respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.”); Stephen B. Burbank, 
Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch Relations, 95 
GEO. L. J. 909, 912 (2007) (discussing that judicial accountability and 
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The powers of the Court are set out in the AIFC Court’s ex-
tensive Rules, which, as already stated, were drafted by the 
Court’s Chief Justice.179  Significant effort has been placed in 
these Rules to balance the public nature of the Court with the 
need to make it as amenable as possible to the degree of party 
autonomy typically associated with international arbitration.180  
This balancing test seems to have been undertaken in a very 
masterful way.  It is beyond the scope of this relatively narrow 
paper to undertake a thorough analysis of the Court’s extensive 
Rules, so we will instead attempt a brief insight into some key 
or innovative features, namely, the availability of Group Litiga-
tion Orders (GLOs) in the event of several claims giving rise to 
common or related issues of fact or law (“GLO issues”).181   
 
Another unique feature of the AIFC Court Rules is the pos-
sibility of a so-called “immediate judgment” under circum-
stances specified in Part 14 of the AIFC Court Rules.182  Part 15 
of the Court Rules consists of an exceptionally detailed section 
on interim remedies and the condition for granting these to a 
claimant.183  This may appeal to investors and their counsel who 
fear that foreign awards against Kazakhstani entities would not 
be followed up by worldwide injunction orders by the courts of 
the seat.184  Part 16 of the Court Rules sets out the contours of 
party-led case progression conferences, which, as already stated, 
requires the parties to agree on how their case will progress.185  
This effectively enhances party autonomy to a significant 
 
independence “should run to the public[,]” so that there is “a legitimate interest 
in ensuring that the judiciary has been responsible . . . and . . . public laws are 
functioning as intended”). 
179 AIFC Ct. Rules 2018, supra note 171, pt. 1, § 1.2, at 1. 
180 See id. pt. 27, at 76–83. 
181 Id. pt. 12, § 12.47, at 33. 
182 Id. pt. 14, at 37–38.  
183 Id. pt. 15, at 40–45. 
184 See Ras Al Khaimah Inv. Auth. v. Bestfort Dev. LLP [2017] EWCA 
1014 (finding a freezing order to be the appropriate means to prevent the de-
fendant from dissipating assets prior to a final judgment); Case C-18/18, Glaw-
ischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ir. Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 55 (Oct. 3, 2019) 
(holding that the EU Directive on Electronic Commerce does not prevent na-
tional courts from ordering a host provider like Facebook to take down online 
content worldwide where the content is declared unlawful pursuant to domes-
tic laws).  
185 AIFC Ct. Rules 2018, supra note 171, pt. 16, §§ 16.1–16.11, at 45–46. 
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degree.186  Part 20 of the Court Rules establishes a process in 
which parties making a settlement offer are not required to show 
these offers or payments to the Court until the question of costs 
is to be decided (offers to settle and payments into court).187  Part 
23 introduces an Abridged Procedure for claims, which includes 
situations where the claimant seeks the Court’s decision on a 
question unlikely to involve a substantial dispute of fact or 
where a Rule or Practice Direction in relation to a specified type 
of proceeding requires or permits the use of the Abridged Proce-
dure.188 
VII. ENFORCEMENT OF AIFC COURT JUDGMENTS 
The AIFC Constitutional Statute is at pains to emphasize 
the sharp distinction between the AIFC Court and the ordinary 
Kazakhstani judicial system.  However, at the same time, such 
a distinction must have some limits, lest it creates more prob-
lems than it purports to resolve.  With respect to the mutual en-
forcement of judgments between the AIFC Court and regular 
Kazakhstani courts, Article 13, Sections (8) and (9) of the AIFC 
Constitutional Statute state: 
 
8. Decisions of the AIFC Court are to be enforced in the Republic 
of Kazakhstan in the same way, and on the same terms, as judicial 
acts of the courts of the Republic of Kazakhstan.  To enforce a de-
cision of the AIFC Court, a translation of the decision into the Ka-
zakh or Russian language, in accordance with the procedure de-
termined by AIFC Acts, is required. 
9. Decisions of the courts of the Republic of Kazakhstan are to be 
enforced in the territory of the AIFC in accordance with legislation 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan.189 
 
This is not only sensible but fully warranted.  Any other outcome 
whereby the AIFC Court was fully insulated from the Kazakh-
stani judicial system would have required extensive legislation 
 
186 See Case Management, GOV.UK (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.jus-
tice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/standard-directions/general/case-man-
agement, for an example of the case management practice in England.  
187 AIFC Ct. Rules 2018, supra note 171, pt. 20, at 63. 
188 Id. pt. 23, at 66–69. 
189 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(8), (9), at 10. 
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and re-negotiation of the country’s bilateral or multilateral trea-
ties pertinent to its courts.190  From the perspective of foreign 
investors, this must surely be the key highlight of the AIFC 
Court.  Although foreign arbitration would have been more fa-
vorable, as stated above, the enforcement of foreign awards will 
always be a problem in Kazakhstan.191  The need for arbitration 
is redundant since a judgment of AIFC can be enforced ipso 
facto, without further restrictions or scrutiny in Kazakhstan, es-
pecially if the AIFC Court is viewed to be just as good and inde-
pendent as foreign-seated arbitral panels.  Although Article 
13(8) and (9) refer to “decisions,”192 this must be an oversight in 
translation, and must also encompass judgments on the merits. 
 
Section 27 of the AIFC Court Regulations provides the 
Court with extensive powers of interim and injunctive relief at 
all stages of the proceedings.193  On the basis of Article 13(8) and 
(9) of the AIFC Constitutional Statute, such orders and decisions 
may be enforced in the Republic of Kazakhstan through ordinary 
Kazakhstani courts.194  What is unclear, although largely im-
plicit, is whether the AIFC Court is endowed with the power to 
issue worldwide injunction orders or whether, in the event of a 
conflicting order or judgment issued by regular Kazakhstani 
courts, it possesses the authority to dismiss the same. 
 
As for the second issue concerning conflicting judgments 
and decisions, the inherent powers of courts and tribunals195 
clearly dictates that the AIFC Court, either on its own motion or 
at the request of any party, may assess the constitutionality or 
 
190 Zambrana-Tévar, supra note 24, at 128–29. 
191 Altynay Mukhametkalikyzy, Hidden Impediments Await Foreign Par-
ties Seeking to Enforce Arbitral Awards in Kazakhstan, KLUWER ARB. BLOG 
(Apr. 1, 2020), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/04/01/hid-
den-impediments-await-foreign-parties-seeking-to-enforce-arbitral-awards-
in-kazakhstan/?.  
192 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(8)–(9), at 10; see also 
AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 9, § 40(2), at 24 (“Judgments, orders 
and directions of the Court, and awards issued in arbitrations seated in the 
AIFC which have been ratified by the Court, may be enforced in the AIFC and 
the Republic of Kazakhstan in accordance with the AIFC Constitutional Stat-
ute.”).  
193 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 6, § 27, at 18. 
194 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(8)–(9), at 10. 
195 BANTEKAS, supra note 146, at 107–13. 
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another defect of a judgment, including also “in the interests of 
justice.”196  It is unfortunate that such authority is not spelled 
out clearly in any AIFC Acts because the scope of abuse is sig-
nificant and may dispel the benefits of enforcement of AIFC 
judgments in the Kazakhstani legal order; especially, if a con-
flicting judgment of the Kazakhstani courts serves to nullify a 
judgment or order of the AIFC Court.  Therefore, it should not 
be taken for granted that any judgment or order of the regular 
Kazakhstani courts will not be enforced in the AIFC if it is in 
conflict with AIFC Acts, judgments, or orders of the AIFC Court, 
or if it fetters the powers of the AIFC Court. 
 
As to the second issue, there is no mention of extra-territo-
rial powers being conferred on the AIFC Court and hence any 
order of this nature will have to be referred to the Kazakhstani 
courts through the pertinent channels.  This eventuality, how-
ever, allows the Kazakhstani courts to deny the transmittal of 
the order on subjective grounds.  Moreover, although the AIFC 
Court may transmit such an order for further execution, it is not 
clear that its content will not be discussed anew by the Kazakh-
stani courts.197 
VIII. CONSISTENCY WITH AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE AND 
ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS 
Unlike other specialized hybrid commercial tribunals, the 
AIFC features an arbitral institution, fully equipped with its 
own arbitration rules.198  Other financial centers, such as the 
QFC, do not have a distinct arbitral chamber,199 chiefly because 
this would defeat the very purpose of the QFC Court.  Of course, 
the QFC Court has an active role in arbitrations by acting as the 
“competent court,” where appropriate, or in enforcing foreign 
awards in the QFC framework.200  
 
Article 14 of the AIFC Constitutional Statute sets up the 
 
196 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 6, §§ 27, 27(2)(j), at 18–19. 
197 Id. pt. 5, § 26(10), at 17.  
198 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48. 
199 See About Us, QATAR INT’L CT. & DISP. RESOL. CTR., 
https://www.qicdrc.gov.qa/about-us (last visited Nov. 10, 2020).  
200 QFC Law No. 2, supra note 47, art. 35.  
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AIFC International Arbitration Centre (IAC) in the form of an 
AIFC body,201 and delineates its relationship with the Kazakh-
stani legal order.202  In accordance with paragraphs three and 
four of Article 14, AIFC IAC awards are enforced as domestic 
awards in the Kazakhstani legal order and the same is equally 
true of awards seated in Kazakhstan.203  The AIFC Court, as al-
ready stated, has been designated as the competent court in re-
lation to arbitrations taking place under the AIFC IAC in ac-
cordance with Section 14 of the AIFC Arbitration Regulations.204  
The Regulations are predicated on the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration (with some excep-
tions),205 a rather sensible decision.  The AIFC Court possesses 
a significant supervisory role over arbitral proceedings, includ-
ing ordering interim measures,206 and the appointment of arbi-
trators in the event of an impasse.207  However, there are some 
instances where significant departure from a merely supervisory 
authority is stipulated.  For example, Section 18 of the AIFC Ar-
bitration Regulations states that while arbitral proceedings are 
confidential, the AIFC Court may rule otherwise through the is-
suance of an order.208 
 
Section 27 of the AIFC Arbitration Regulations is especially 
confusing.  Unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law or transnational 
arbitral practice whereby the parties are free to approach both 
 
201 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra, note 68, art. 14, at 11. 
202 Id. In 2019, Kazakhstan amended its 2016 Law on Arbitration with 
the aim of internationalizing its arbitration industry. See Cameron Ford, Ka-
zakhstan Internationalises Arbitration Law, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Aug. 19, 
2019), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/08/19/kazakhstan-
internationalises-arbitration-law/. The new law is known as the Law of the Re-
public of Kazakhstan No. 217-VI “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Strengthening the Protection of 
Property Rights, Arbitration, Optimizing the Judicial Caseload, and Further 
Humanizing the Criminal Law.” Id. It has been welcomed by the international 
legal community. See id. 
203 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 14(3)–(4), at 11. 
204 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, pt. 2, ch. 1, § 14, at 2–3. 
205 See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 97. 
206 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, ch. 2, § 17, at 3; see also Interex 
& Co. v. Prom Region KZ LLP, Сase No. АIFC-С/СFI/2020/0001, Judgment ¶ 
2 (AIFC Ct. of First Instance May 11, 2020), where the court exercised its au-
thority of interim measures to enforce an arbitral award. 
207 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, ch. 3, § 20, at 4–5. 
208 Id. ch. 2, § 18, at 3–4. 
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the tribunal and the courts of the seat with all requests concern-
ing the imposition and enforcement of interim measures, this is 
not the case in the AIFC Court.209  The bigger part of the provi-
sion suggests that all relevant requests fall under the authority 
of the tribunal.210  Then, paragraph two goes on to say that: 
 
With the written permission of the arbitral tribunal a party in 
whose favour an interim measure has been granted may request 
from the AIFC Court of First Instance an order enforcing the arbi-
tral tribunal’s order or any part of it.  Any request for permission 
or enforcement made under this Article shall be simultaneously 
copied to all other parties.  Unless the arbitral tribunal at any time 
directs otherwise, the party making a request to the AIFC Court 
of First Instance under this Article shall be entitled to recover in 
the arbitration any legal costs and AIFC Court of First Instance 
fees reasonably incurred.211 
 
It is certainly a novelty that the parties must seek permission 
from the tribunal before approaching the courts of the seat—in 
this case, the AIFC Court—with a request to enforce the order, 
given that the tribunal cannot on its own achieve such an out-
come.212  So, what if the tribunal does not provide written con-
sent?  This does not make much sense and provides a serious 
impediment to the parties.  Paragraph 3(b) of Section 27 confers 
significant power on the AIFC Court in that the latter is permit-
ted to refuse recognition of an interim measure ordered by a 
court outside the AIFC if it is found to be ultra vires.213  This is 
a powerful tool in the armory of the AIFC Court and may ap-
pease investors that Kazakhstani courts are not going to inter-
fere in arbitral proceedings in the AIFC.  Paragraph five of Sec-
tion 27 conforms to the UNCITRAL Model Law by stating that 
“[t]he AIFC Court shall have the same power of issuing an in-
terim measure in relation to arbitration proceedings, where 
their seat is in the AIFC, as it has in relation to proceedings in 
 
209 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, ch. 4, § 27, at 7–9; UNCITRAL 
Model Law, supra note 97, ch. IV.A, § 1, art. 17(1), at 9. 
210 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, ch. 4, § 27(1), at 7–8. 
211 Id. ch. 4, § 27(2), at 8. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. ch. 4, § 27(3)(b), at 8. 
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the AIFC Court.”214 
 
It is not at all clear if paragraph two is incompatible with 
the express and unequivocal terms of paragraph five of Section 
27, or if it constitutes a very exceptional deviation from the gen-
eral rule enunciated in paragraph five.215 
 
Finally, Section 45 of the AIFC Arbitration Rules makes it 
crystal clear that all awards issued by the AIFC tribunal, as well 
as awards issued elsewhere, are to be enforced in the AIFC 
Court in accordance with the bilateral and multilateral treaties 
to which Kazakhstan is a party.216  Hence, for the purposes of 
enforcement of awards and judgments, the AIFC is not an excep-
tional territory for which Kazakhstan would have been obliged 
to make a unilateral declaration.  Moreover, AIFC awards are 
Kazakhstani awards for the purposes of the New York Conven-
tion.217 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This paper has taken a critical stance on the AIFC Court, 
pointing out both shortcomings and various positive features 
that make the Court stand out from ordinary Kazakhstani 
courts.  None of this criticism was meant as an attack against 
this institution; quite the contrary.  The AIFC Court is a beacon 
of the rule of law in Kazakhstan and a first attempt at creating 
an impartial judicial institution that is independent of bias and 
the intervention of government;218 or at least, so it is hoped.  
 
214 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, ch. 4, § 27(5), at 9; UNCITRAL 
Model Law, supra note 97, ch. IV.A, § 1, art. 17(1), at 9. 
215 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, ch. 4, § 27(2), (5), at 9; see also 
KAZ. CODE OF CIV. PROC., supra note 121, art. 492 (determining the criteria un-
der which award creditors may apply for interim measures against assets 
owned by a sovereign state). 
216 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, ch. 7, pt. 3, § 45, at 16.  
217 Philip Kim, Why arbitrate at the Astana International Financial Cen-
tre?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Sept. 19, 2018), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitra-
tion.com/2018/09/19/why-arbitrate-at-the-astana-international-financial-cen-
tre/. 
218 Arif Durrani & Gabe Kirchheimer, Why Invest in Kazakhstan?, 





Unfortunately, this is not enough since the very need to estab-
lish the AIFC and the AIFC Court necessarily stems from the 
fact that Kazakhstan is not perceived as providing the legal and 
political stability for trade and investment.219  The AIFC is de-
signed as an “island of difference” from the ordinary Kazakh-
stani investment and trade landscape, even if it is focused on 
specific investments in theory.220  This is not the case with the 
AIFC’s Gulf counterparts, where healthy and diversified econo-
mies already existed, and political and legal stability were never 
issues of concern.221  What this means is that Kazakhstan should 
make every effort to feed the work of the AIFC Court into its 
judicial and legal system.  If this does not occur, then the AIFC 
will be an illegitimate institution that sustains a regime that is 
averse to overall change. 
 
No doubt, with the proliferation of international courts and 
tribunals, the AIFC Court will endeavor to make its mark.  Re-
cent history has shown that the stature, authority, and overall 
gravitas of individual judges make or break the reputation and 
credibility of an international court.222  Conformity only helps an 
institution hide in obscurity, which is exactly what the AIFC 
Court and AIFC do not want.223  These institutions are desirous 
of visibility, the boosting of investor confidence, and the percep-
tion that justice is not only served but served at the highest pos-
sible level.   
 
219 See Durrani & Kirchheimer, supra note 218.  
220 Joanna Lillis, Kazakhstan: Will Astana’s financial gamble pay off?, 
EURASIANET (Aug. 7, 2018), https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-will-astanas-fi-
nancial-gamble-pay-off. 
221 Zambrana-Tévar, supra note 24, at 122. 
222 The AIFC Court employs judges with international reputation and ex-
perience, including its first chief justice, Lord Woolf. See Justices, AIFC, 
https://court.aifc.kz/who-we-are/justices/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2020). The cur-
rent line-up is equally impressive, led by Lord Mance. Id. 
223 See Reuters Staff, Seeking Belt buckle role, Kazakhstan launches 
China-backed financial hub, REUTERS (July 5, 2018, 7:19 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kazakhstan-aifc/seeking-belt-buckle-role-
kazakhstan-launches-china-backed-financial-hub-idUSKBN1JV1CG, for a 
discussion regarding the AIFC’s hope that outside companies will utilize its 
dispute resolution services and that the AIFC Court’s desire to become an “in-
termediary between larger nations and a gateway for foreign investment” 
while, unlike other courts of a similar nature, not requiring its members to be 
present in the Kazakhstani capital. 
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We are still in the AIFC’s infancy and, hopefully, all of these 
goals will end up being materialized.  Given the growth of the 
Kazakhstani economy and the companies listed in the AIFC, it 
is a matter of time before they realize that speedy dispute reso-
lution is better served in the AIFC Court as opposed to interna-
tional commercial arbitration; particularly, if the Kazakhstani 
government is seen honoring international awards against its 
public entities both abroad, but more importantly, at home. 
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